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Abstract: Spinoza’s necessitarianism—the doctrine that everything that is actual is 
necessary—is an important matter of debate in German Idealism. I examine Schelling’s 
discussion of Spinoza’s necessitarianism in his 1809 Freedom Essay and focus in particular 
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There can be little doubt that in its influence on the development of post-Kantian German 
Idealism, Spinoza’s philosophy is second only to Kant’s. Important strands of philosophical 
debate within the idealist movement go back to the famous dispute on Spinozism that is 
triggered by Jacobi’s On the Doctrine of Spinoza. Idealists like Maimon, Schelling, and 
Hegel thoroughly engaged with Spinoza’s writings, and Schelling himself even adopts a 
version of Spinozism at some stages of his career. Yet, while a substantive amount of 
scholarship has been devoted to Spinoza’s influence on the idealist movement,
1
 there is 
 2 
surprisingly little discussion in the literature about the idealists’ views on one of the most 
crucial elements of Spinoza’s philosophy: his modal metaphysics.
2
  
At the core of Spinoza’s modal metaphysics is a position that is known as 
‘necessitarianism,’ the view that everything that is actual is necessary, or that there is no 
contingency. For the case of God as substance and the attributes that constitute his essence,
3
 
this necessity follows from the fact that God’s essence includes existence.
4
 For God’s modes, 
necessity follows from the fact that these modes are necessary consequences from His nature: 
“all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce 
an effect in a certain way” (E IP29).
5
 Therefore, Spinoza holds, “In nature there is nothing 
contingent” (E IP29) and, “Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in 
no other order than they have been produced” (E IP33).
6
  
Necessitarianism is a radical view. In particular, it is much stronger than determinism. 
Roughly speaking, determinism holds that given the causal past plus the laws of nature, only 
one course of events is possible. But normally, determinists allow that the causal past and/or 
the laws of nature could themselves have been different, and that, had they been different, 
another course of events would have taken place. As traditional compatibilists about freedom 
and determinism have argued, determinism leaves room for alternative possibilities. By 
contrast, necessitarians deny that there is such a thing as an unactualized possibility. For 
them, there is absolutely only one way things could have possibly been: the way they actually 
are. Hence, necessitarianism excludes not only libertarian accounts of freedom, but also 
traditional forms of compatibilism à la Hume, Locke, and Leibniz.
7
  
For an idealist like Schelling, it is an urgent theoretical task to clarify his stance 
towards necessitarianism. For, on the one hand, he emphatically wants to develop a “system 
of freedom” that grants freedom a central theoretical role, rather than denying its existence. 
On the other hand, he aims to explain finite reality as following necessarily from a basic 
principle (an Absolute, God), which itself exists necessarily. Hence, Schelling’s explanatory 
project tends towards necessitarian implications that would leave space for freedom only in 
an extremely reduced sense. Schelling is not always entirely clear about what stance he 
wishes to take regarding this issue. But there are two texts in which Schelling does address 
 3 
necessitarianism and, more specifically, Spinoza’s version of it in considerable detail: 
Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Human Freedom—the so-called Freedom 
Essay—of 1809, and the Spinoza section of the 1833/34 lectures On the History of Modern 
Philosophy.
8
 Not only do these discussions shed important light on Schelling’s own 
metaphysical positions, they also develop original criticisms of Spinoza’s necessitarianism 
that are of philosophical interest in their own right. Nevertheless, scholarship so far has 
largely failed to analyze this strand in Schelling’s reception of Spinoza.  
It is my aim in this article to close this gap for the case of Schelling’s discussion of 
Spinoza’s necessitarianism in the Freedom Essay.
9
 Schelling’s discussion of Spinoza’s 
necessitarianism in the Freedom Essay centers on the charge that Spinoza sees reality as 
governed by “blind necessity,” and that such a view is deeply unsatisfactory. Schelling is not 
the only author to have criticized Spinoza’s necessitarianism in terms of blind necessity, and 
some versions of this critique are relatively trivial.
10
 But as I hope to show in the following, 
Schelling develops a nuanced and philosophically interesting understanding of the notion of 
blind necessity, which can be spelled out in the form of original objections against Spinoza’s 
necessitarianism. 
I proceed as follows. In section 1, I will contextualize Schelling’s discussion of 
Spinoza in the Freedom Essay both with regard to his own earlier writings and Leibniz’s 
discussion of Spinoza’s blind necessity in the Theodicy, which he explicitly draws on. As I 
hope to show, Schelling rejects the Leibnizian alternative to Spinoza’s necessitarianism 
because he denies that God has any alternative to creating the actual world. Section 2 
addresses the question of whether Schelling’s denial of divine choice commits him to 
necessitarianism and develops a reading that avoids this implication. In sections 3 to 5, I turn 
to the question how we should understand Schelling’s charge of blind necessity if not in 
Leibnizian terms. In section 3, I explore some of the necessary background in Schelling’s 
theory of personhood, while in sections 4 and 5, I develop two interpretations of his own 
version of the charge of blind necessity that center on the notions of divine personhood and 
love. Section 6 concludes by asking how Schelling’s metaphysics, in the Freedom Essay, 




1.  The Context of Schelling’s Discussion 
 
The Freedom Essay of 1809 marks an important stage in the development both of Schelling’s 
philosophy in general, and of his attitude towards Spinozism in particular. Schelling engages 
with Spinoza since his days in the Tübinger Stift, and grants references to and discussions of 
Spinoza an important place in his early writings.
11
 However, Spinoza’s necessitarianism is 
not an issue in these texts. Rather, Spinozism mainly figures there (a) as the most consequent 
version of dogmatism,
12
 (b) as a precursor of Schelling’s own ideal-realism
13
 or his 
philosophy of nature,
14
 and (c) as inspiration for an account of the Absolute as pure activity 
that is free in the sense that it only follows its own nature.
15
 Importantly, this latter account of 
the Absolute has no necessitarian implications for the early Schelling (nor does he discuss its 
relation to necessitarianism). In that period, Schelling instead assumes indeterminism at the 
level of finite subjects, allowing for a libertarian “transcendental . . . freedom,” which he 
interprets as the “empirical” counterpart (SW I 1:237/“Of the I,” 123), or as the 
“appearance” (SW I 1:435/“Treatise,” 126), of Spinoza’s freedom of the Absolute.
16
 
Things change when Schelling develops his Philosophy of Identity in the early 1800s. 
In his texts from this period, Schelling imitates Spinoza’s metaphysics in many respects, and 
even partially adopts Spinoza’s mos geometricus.
17
 In the culminating text of the Philosophy 
of Identity, the so-called Würzburg System (“System of Philosophy in General and of the 
Philosophy of Nature in Particular”) of 1804, Schelling goes as far as to explicitly subscribe 
to necessitarianism.
18
 As a consequence, Schelling explains away all free choice as a mere 
illusion,
19
 just like Spinoza.
20
 Given this adherence to necessitarianism in 1804, it is not 
surprising that when Schelling revises his position again in his next major work, the Freedom 
Essay, he motivates this through an extensive discussion of Spinoza’s modal metaphysics.
21
  
The “highest question” of the Freedom Essay, Schelling tells us at an important 
juncture of the text, is the question of theodicy: the question of how God “as moral being” 
relates to the moral evil that we find in the world He has created (SW I 7:394/FS 58). As 
 5 
Schelling claims, this question can be properly addressed only after a “preliminary question” 
has been decided, namely, “Is revelation an action that ensues with blind and unconscious 
necessity or is it a free and conscious action?” (SW I 7:394/FS 58)—where by ‘revelation,’ 
Schelling refers to God’s production of the finite world. While Schelling does opt for the 
second option and sees “revelation” as “free and conscious action,” it soon becomes clear that 
the first option—“revelation” as something that “ensues with blind and unconscious 
necessity”—primarily stands for Spinoza’s necessitarianism. It is therefore an important task 
for Schelling to refute this necessitarianism, and thus to clear the ground for his assessment 
of the problem of theodicy.  
What exactly does it mean for Schelling that Spinozism makes divine revelation (or 
creation) subject to a “blind and unconscious necessity,” rather than a “free and conscious 
action”? And what reasons does Schelling have to reject the view he ascribes to Spinoza? As 
a first step toward answering these questions, we need to examine Leibniz’s critique of 
Spinoza’s necessitarianism as presented in the Theodicy and to which Schelling explicitly 
refers in the context of his discussion of Spinoza.”
22
  
In §§168–74 of the Theodicy,
23
 Leibniz discusses metaphysical positions that 
contradict his mature
24
 solution to the problems of free will and theodicy—the solution 
according to which human actions are hypothetically necessary (i.e. they necessarily follow 
from God’s decision to create the best of all possible worlds), but not absolutely, that is, 
unconditionally necessary.
25
 Among these incompatible views are necessitarian views, on 
which “there is nothing possible except that which actually happens” (T §168/Theodicy, 228), 
that is, views on which everything is absolutely necessary.
26
 Leibniz examines several 
versions of necessitarianism, but the one that there is “most reason for opposing” (T  
§168/Theodicy, 229) is Spinozism. Leibniz tells us that Spinoza  
 
<ext> 
appears to have explicitly taught a blind necessity, having denied to the Author of Things 
understanding and will. . . . [He] teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the 




Leibniz formulates several objections to Spinozism. Thus, he argues that Spinoza 
cannot allow for realistic fictions that describe possible but non-actual scenarios.
27
 And at a 
later point of the Theodicy, he objects to Spinozism on the basis of the special laws of 
nature;
28
 according to Leibniz, these laws are contingent (as they cannot be analytically 
demonstrated), and the fact that these rather than other, less simple laws govern our world 
shows that this world is grounded in the purposeful choice of “an intelligent and free being” 
(T §345/Theodicy, 332). But Leibniz’s most fundamental worry about Spinozism is not that it 
cannot deal with such objections, but that the very notion of a “blind necessity” that governs 
everything is deeply mistaken: he claims that it makes Spinoza’s version of necessitarianism 
“so bad, and indeed so inexplicable” a view that it is not even necessary to refute it (T 
§173/Theodicy, 234).  
As the passage from §173 of Theodicy that I have quoted above suggests, Spinoza’s 
necessity is ‘blind,’ for Leibniz, because Spinoza rejects a common view of creation, which is 
shared by Leibniz. On this view, creation is an intelligent action of a personal, rational agent. 
It results from a free choice that God makes in virtue of His will; this choice, in its turn, is 
based on a perfect understanding of the chosen object (and, for Leibniz, of all alternatives to 
it), which God possesses in virtue of His intellect.
29
 By contrast, Spinoza denies that God’s 
creation is anything like the outcome of an informed choice or an action out of reasons;
30
 as 
Leibniz claims in the above passage, he both denies that God has any choice between 
different possibilities,
31
 and he rejects the assumptions that the traditional view makes about 
God’s mind. It bears emphasis that Leibniz is inaccurate when he writes that Spinoza’s God 





Nevertheless, divine intellect and will are not something that guides God’s action on 
Spinoza’s understanding of these terms; rather, they are part of natura naturata, or of what 
God brings about.
34
 So even though he does not deny a divine intellect and will, the necessity 
that governs everything for Spinoza is indeed blind insofar as it does not proceed from insight 
 7 




; it is 
not “full of counsel” (Specimen demonstrationum catholicarum [A VI 4:2323]).  
In the Theodicy, Leibniz does not explain why he finds Spinoza’s resulting view so 
“bad” and “inexplicable” that it is patently wrong, but it seems clear that one important 
motivation for his dismissal of Spinoza’s position is the following. The traditional view of 
creation has the consequence that both the act of creation and the created world as its 
outcome are open to explanations in terms of purposes or final causes, and as is well known, 
Leibniz grants such explanations a central place in his metaphysics. By contrast, Spinoza 
denies both final causes in nature and purposeful divine action (E IApp [G II.80/C I.442–
43]). So, for Leibniz, Spinoza’s assumption that reality is governed by a blind, non-intelligent 
necessity makes reality ultimately unintelligible.
37
 Of course, Spinoza subscribes, like 
Leibniz, to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and therefore holds that there is an explanation 
for everything.
38
 Still, Spinoza leaves no room outside of the sphere of human agency for the 
teleological form of understanding that, on Leibniz’s view, we need to apply to reality as a 
whole in order to (among other things) appreciate its perfect rational order and goodness,
39
 
make sense of the existence of evil, and guide scientific research.  
So much for Leibniz’s stance towards Spinoza’s necessitarianism, as it is expressed in 
the sections of the Theodicy that Schelling draws on. What is Schelling’s own view on this 
matter? Initially, it is tempting to think that Schelling closely follows Leibniz in the way he 
understands this notion and in his motivation for rejecting such blind necessity. Schelling 
himself not only talks about Spinoza’s “blind necessity” in the same context in which he 
engages with Leibniz’s discussion of Spinoza, he also directly adopts Leibniz’s objections 
from fiction
40
 and from special laws of nature.
41
 Furthermore, Schelling at one place equates 
Spinoza’s blind necessity with an “inanimate and impersonal [unlebendig und unpersönlich]” 
necessity (SW I 7:397/FS 61, translation modified), whereas the action-guiding intellect and 
will that the common view of creation ascribes to God were traditionally seen as defining 
features of a personal God. And finally, Schelling characterizes Spinoza’s necessity as 
“blind” and “without understanding [verstandlos]” (SW I 7:397/FS 61, translation modified). 
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Hence, like Leibniz, he relates the notion of blind necessity to Spinoza’s denial of traditional 
accounts of God’s mind.  
Nevertheless, such a Leibnizian reading of Schelling’s charge of blind necessity 
cannot be correct. For in the same context in which he engages with Leibniz’s discussion of 
Spinoza, Schelling explicitly rejects crucial parts both of the traditional and of Leibniz’s 
alternative to Spinoza when he writes that “the notion of God’s deliberating with himself or 
of a choice among various possible worlds remains a notion that is groundless and untenable” 
(SW I 7:397/FS 60–61, translation modified). We can distinguish two important aspects in 
the critique that Schelling formulates here. First, Schelling denies that creation results from 
deliberation; similarly, in the “Stuttgart Seminars,” he rejects a view of God as acting “ex 
ratione boni” (SW I 7: 429/“Stuttgart Seminars,” 204),
42
 and, in the Freedom Essay, he 
claims that, in the nature that God creates, “there is not simply pure reason but personhood 
and spirit (as we likely distinguish the rational author from one possessing wit)” (SW I 
7:395/FS 59). All this suggests that, for Schelling, Leibniz’s idea of God as ideal rational 
agent who brings about a purposeful world overrationalizes God. 
Second, Schelling rejects the view that creation involves a choice between different 
possibilities. He goes on to argue that this would lead to the absurd consequence that God 
was able to create a world that was not the best possible one.
43
 The reason why this 
consequence is absurd for Schelling is that it contradicts God’s essential goodness and 
perfection: “God according to his perfection can only will one thing,” namely, “the only 
possible world according to God’s essence” (SW I/7:398/FS 62).  
As these latter formulations show, Schelling’s rejection of divine choice is based on 
an objection against Leibniz that was already raised by Leibniz’s contemporaries:
44
 God’s 
essential goodness seems to imply that God really has no choice but to create the best 
possible world, and hence the actual world. Put in modal terms, God’s essential goodness 
makes Leibniz’s crucial distinction between a “hypothetical” or “moral” necessity, on the one 
hand, and an “unconditional” or “metaphysical” necessity, on the other hand, collapse, so that 
God’s act of creating the actual world becomes unconditionally necessary. As Schelling 
 9 
points out, “if God is essentially love and goodness, then what is morally necessary in him 
also follows with a truly metaphysical necessity” (SW I 7:397/FS 61).
45
  
Leibniz himself was clearly aware of the problem that Schelling points to and 
developed various ways of dealing with it.
46
 But as our focus is with Schelling’s position, we 
will not examine these solutions here. Rather, what matters for our present discussion is that 
Schelling himself subscribes to a view on which God’s creation of the actual world is, pace 
Leibniz, unconditionally necessary and devoid of alternative possibilities. We can call this 
view “One World”:  
 
<ext> 
(One World) With metaphysical necessity: [God creates the actual world], 
</ext> 
 
where the square brackets are meant to create a tense-free context.   
So, it turns out that Schelling cannot understand the charge of “blind necessity” in the 
same way as Leibniz—viz. as lack of intelligent divine agency—given that Schelling thinks 
that God is not aptly characterized as an intelligent agent who acts out of insight into reasons 
and as result of a free choice. But this leads not only to the question of how else Schelling 
understands the notion of blind necessity, but should also make us wonder how his position 
differs from Spinoza’s at all. For as we have now seen, Schelling agrees with Spinoza that 
God has no choice between different possibilities; rather, He can create only one world.
47
 So, 
is Schelling not himself committed to a form of necessitarianism? I address this question in 
the next section, before coming back to the question of how Schelling understands the charge 
of blind necessity in subsequent sections.   
 
 
2. Does Schelling Endorse Necessitarianism in the Freedom Essay? 
 
 10 
In addressing the question whether Schelling’s “One World” claim in the Freedom Essay 
commits him to necessitarianism (despite his critique of Spinoza), we should begin by noting 
that the overall argument in that text is clearly incompatible with any form of 
necessitarianism. For it is one crucial aim of this argument to establish that the existence of 
moral evil is caused by our free choice and therefore due to our responsibility, not God’s: 
“evil remains always man’s own choice; . . . every creature falls due to its own guilt” (SW I 
7:382/FS 48, translation modified). Schelling is explicit that he relies here on a libertarian 
notion of an unconditioned free choice: “Man is placed on that summit where he has in 
himself the source of self-movement toward good or evil in equal portions . . . ; whatever he 
chooses, it will be his act” (SW I 7:374/FS 41).
48
 So Schelling’s argument presupposes the 
truth of indeterminism,
49
 and is therefore incompatible with necessitarianism.  
But how can Schelling assume that there is only one world, namely, the actual world, 
that God can possibly create, and at the same time subscribe to indeterminism? Does the 
claim that God necessarily creates the actual world not entail that things could not have been 
any other way, and hence, necessitarianism?  
It is true that such an entailment would have held for Leibniz. But although Schelling 
strongly draws on Leibniz and adopts some of his terminology in this context, we should be 
aware of the possibility that he may give his own interpretations to Leibnizian language. In 
particular, formulations like that of “the only possible world according to God’s essence,” 
and his assertion that “God according to his perfection can only will one thing” (SW I 
7:398/FS 62), imply necessitarianism only if a particular view of divine will and creation is 
presupposed: a view—like Leibniz’s—on which the divine will has as its object a fully 
specified world, and divine creation correspondingly settles each and every detail about the 
created world.
50
 But this Leibnizian view is not without alternatives. For theistic thinkers who 
subscribe to libertarianism about human freedom, it is natural to assume that God’s agency 
(in creation, but also in subsequent interventions if there are any) only settles a limited range 
of features of the world, while leaving open how human beings decide to act.
51
 For someone 
who holds such a view, that God can create only one world, or that He “can only will one 
thing” (SW I 7:398/FS 62), can simply mean that God’s essence leaves room for only one 
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such limited set of features as being brought about by God, while this set of features does not 
fully specify the created world, and in particular does not specify how human beings act.
52
 
This provides an interpretation of Schelling’s “One World” thesis and his related 
formulations that is, unlike the Leibnizian interpretation, compatible with his commitment to 
indeterminism. Not only is this reading therefore more charitable than the Leibnizian one, it 
also gains support from a part of Schelling’s discussion in which he further explains his 
views on human freedom and responsibility. As Schelling points out, indeterminist free 
choice is not located at the level of individual human actions. Rather, such actions are free to 
the extent to which they express the agent’s nature or moral character (his “intelligible 
being,” as Schelling calls it [SW I 7:384/FS 49]).
53
 But following Kant’s notorious doctrine 
of the “intelligible deed” in which we adopt an intelligible character (Religion, 6:31), 
Schelling holds that this character itself is imputable to the agent because it is adopted in an 
unconditioned act of choice. Like Kant, Schelling ascribes this act to the “intelligible being” 
of the individual man “outside all causal connectedness as it is outside or above all time” 
(SW I 7:383/FS 49)—that is, to man as thing in itself, as opposed to man as appearance.  
To this Kantian account, Schelling adds a further point that is important regarding the 
issue of his “One World” claim:  
 
<ext> 
Man is in the initial creation . . . an undecided being . . .—only man himself can decide. But 
this decision cannot occur within time; it occurs outside of all time and, hence, together with 
the first creation (though as a deed distinct from creation). (SW I 385–86/FS 51) 
</ext> 
 
Here, Schelling explicitly claims that there is a sphere of unconditioned human choice that is 
not affected by divine agency: God’s creation leaves men “undecided,” that is, without a 
determinate moral character; through their own choice of such a character, human beings 
“determine” how they will act at the level of individual actions in time. It is therefore fair to 
conclude the following: while there is for Schelling only one course of divine action that is 
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compatible with God’s essence, this does not settle how human beings decide and act. Rather, 
in addition to what is settled by divine action, there are the unconditioned atemporal acts in 
which human beings choose their moral character, and it is these free human decisions that 
fix how human beings behave at the level of individual actions in time.  
One important question that the resulting picture raises is why Schelling (unlike either 
Spinoza or Leibniz) assumes such an asymmetry between, on the one hand, God as acting out 
of necessity, and, on the other hand, man as capable of indeterminist choice. We will come 
back to this question in the next section.  
 
 
3. Schelling on Personhood 
 
We have seen so far that, in the Freedom Essay, Schelling (a) joins Leibniz in opposing 
Spinoza’s blind necessity, (b) denies Leibniz’s view that God has a choice between different 
possibilities, and yet (c) also rejects necessitarianism by ascribing to human beings an 
indeterminist free choice of moral character. This finally enables us to address, in this and the 
next section, the question of how precisely Schelling understands the charge of blind 
necessity he levels against Spinoza, if not along the lines of Leibniz’s version of that critique.  
We saw earlier that Leibniz characterizes Spinoza’s “blind” necessity also as 
“inanimate and impersonal” necessity, and as “necessity devoid of understanding” (SW I 
7:397/FS 61). Since it has turned out that Schelling cannot mean these descriptions in the 
sense in which Leibniz uses similar characterizations of Spinoza’s necessity, we need to ask 
how else he may understand them. So, we must clarify what accounts of personhood, life, and 
understanding Schelling relies on in his critique of Spinoza; and, as he elsewhere in the 
Freedom Essay treats both ‘life’ and ‘understanding’ as aspects of ‘personhood,’
54
 the 
primary task at this point is to understand what Schelling means by ‘personhood.’  
Schelling’s account of ‘personhood’ in the Freedom Essay raises many questions in 
its own right,
55
 especially since it depends on his crucial but difficult distinction between two 
ontological aspects of entities in general: “the entity [Wesen] in so far as it exists [existiert] 
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and the entity [Wesen] in so far as it is merely the ground of existence [Grund von Existenz]” 
(SW I 7:357/FS 27, translation modified). For present purposes, I must restrict myself to 
sketching what I take to be the most promising interpretation of this distinction, and of the 
account of personhood that Schelling bases on it.  
While Schelling does very little in this text to elucidate the distinction between the 
ground of existence and the entity insofar as it exists, he gets more explicit about it in several 
texts written soon after the publication of the Freedom Essay. Three points are particularly 
important. First, in his open letter about the Freedom Essay to Carl August von Eschenmayer 
(April, 1812), Schelling indicates that by ‘existence,’ he means in this context the 
“revelation” of a “subject that is merely in itself,” or “externally efficacious existence” (SW I 
8:173).
56
 In other words, ‘existence’ here stands for the interaction of an entity with other 
entities. Second, in a letter to his friend Eberhard Friedrich Georgii of July 18, 1810, 
Schelling points out that by the “ground” of existence, he does not refer to a cause, but to a 
“foundation,” “basis,” “means of realization,” or “conditio sine qua non” (Aus Schellings 
Leben, 2:221).
57
 So contrary to what the term ‘ground’ may initially suggest, the “ground of 
existence” provides merely a necessary, not a sufficient condition for “existence,” that is, 
efficacy or interaction.  
Third, in the “Stuttgart Seminars” of 1810, Schelling describes the ground of 
existence in the case of God as “that whereby he exists as a particular, unique, and individual 
being” (SW I 7:438/“Stuttgart Seminars,” 210, translation modified). By contrast, God as 
existing is described here in terms of a “universal” principle that is “infinitely 
communicative” (SW I 7:438–39/“Stuttgart Seminars,” 210). The relation between both 
principles in God is characterized as follows: the “universal entity [allgemeine Wesen] does 
not float in the air but rather is grounded in, as it were supported by, God as individual entity 
[individuelles Wesen]—the individual in God thus is the basis or foundation of the universal” 
(SW I 7:438/“Stuttgart Seminars,” 210, translation modified). Assuming that these 
characterizations apply to finite entities, too, the latter passages add an important further 
detail regarding the “ground of existence”: this ground is necessary for interaction (or 
“universal,” “communicative” existence) because it is a principle of individuation—it is 
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responsible for the numerical distinctness of the entity, and without such individuation, there 
would be no entity that could interact with others.
58  
 
It bears emphasis, however, that Schelling can only have in mind here a very narrow 
notion of individuation, which establishes merely numerical distinctness. Thus, consider the 
case of human beings: that they are individuals in the richer sense of concrete persons with 
determinate features—a determinate moral character, and even a determinate body
59
—is, for 
Schelling, a consequence of their free atemporal choice; and, as we shall presently see, this 
choice essentially goes beyond the mere dimension of the ground in man, as it constitutes a 
taking-stance precisely towards the relation between both principles.  
Related to its role as principle of individuation in this qualified sense is a further 
aspect that Schelling connotes with the dimension of the ground—that of being something 
hidden, inscrutable and irrational: the ground is that which “with the greatest exertion cannot 
be resolved in understanding” (SW I 7:360/FS 29). This point mirrors traditional theories of 
individuation, as prominent candidates for a principle of individuation in medieval 
metaphysics such as matter (Avicenna and Aquinas) and individual forms (Duns Scotus) are 
similarly inscrutable.
60
 By contrast, Schelling often uses the metaphor of “light” to 
characterize the dimension of the existing entity,
61
 suggesting that this side of entities is open 
to rational understanding.  
Hence, we can understand Schelling’s distinction between the “ground of existence” 
and the “existing entity” as referring to two fundamental dimensions of everything that exists: 
a dimension of “closure” in virtue of which an entity is an individual, and hence, separate 
from other entities and hidden from rational scrutiny; and an opposite dimension of 
“openness” in virtue of which the entity interacts with other entities, and can be rationally 
understood.  
We now can see how Schelling develops an account of personhood for the case of 
human beings by applying his general model of ground of existence vs. existing entity to the 
case of human beings. As he points out, the two principles correspond to two different 
dimensions of the human will: the ground of existence corresponds to a “self-will 
[Eigenwille]” that is initially “pure craving or desire,” while the existing entity corresponds to 
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a “universal will [Universalwille]” that Schelling also identifies with “understanding 
[Verstand]” (SW I 7:363/FS 32). Unfortunately, Schelling does not further explain the terms 
‘self-will’ and ‘universal will’. On the most natural reading, ‘self-will’ stands for brute and 
given (and hence, rationally inscrutable) drives, desires etc. that do not take into account the 
interests of other human beings and therefore correspond to the metaphysical dimension of 
“closure.” By contrast, ‘universal will’ stands, on this reading, for more or less reflected and 
transparent attitudes in which the individual human being opens itself to the interests of other 
human beings (corresponding to the metaphysical dimension of “openness”).
62
  
Given this duality of principles in in human beings generally, the life of an individual 
human being will consist in a process that is driven by the tension and interaction between 
both sides. In this process, we examine and clarify—and thus raise to consciousness—both 
the demands of our self-will and of our universal will, and try to integrate them with each 
other.
63
 However, this need for integration confronts us with the question of how to prioritize 
the self-will and the universal will: we can either “transfigure” the self-will so that it 
harmonizes or is “one” with the universal will (SW I 7:363/FS 32), and use the motivational 
force of the self-will as “instrument” (SW I 7:389/FS 54) that enacts the (morally good) 
demands of the universal will. Or we can turn things upside down, subordinating the 
universal will to the self-will.
64
 Which way we go is up to us, and decided by us in our free, 
atemporal choice of moral character.  
Hence, the dimension of the ground and that of the existing entity interact in man in 
such a way that human freedom, or the “capacity for good and evil” (SW I 7:352/FS 23), 
arises. It is therefore not the dimension of the existing entity, of “light” or of rationality as 
such that allows us to overcome the dimension of the ground, but our freedom, which 
emerges in the dynamic interplay of those two principles. Human freedom, thus understood, 
is the core of human personhood: 
 
<ext> 
The principle raised up from the ground of nature whereby man is separated from God [i.e. 
the principle of the ground of existence] is the selfhood in him which, however, through its 
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unity with the ideal principle [i.e. the principle of the existing entity], becomes spirit. 
Selfhood as such is spirit; or man is spirit as a particular being, endowed with a self 
[selbstisch] (separated from God)—precisely this connection constitutes personality. Since 
selfhood is spirit, however, it is at the same time raised from the creaturely into what is above 






As a result, Schelling understands personhood as interaction between a self-will and a 
universal will that gives rise to freedom. Schelling thinks that he can straightforwardly apply 
this account to God as well.
66
 God, too, displays the two sides of a ground of existence and of 
an existing entity; and in His case, too, these two sides correspond to distinct “wills.” To the 
dimension of God as existing entity corresponds an “ideal” side in Him—a “will of love” or 
“will to revelation” (SW I 7:375/FS 42) that strives towards revelation, creation and 
communication. Distinct from this will of love is the “will of the ground.” This will 
ultimately aims at divine self-revelation, too, but since such revelation presupposes 
“something resistant in which it can realize itself,” the will of the ground brings about 
“particularity and opposition,” factors that oppose divine revelation (SW I 7:375–76/FS 42). 
The will of the ground therefore amounts to a “tendency in God working against the will to 
revelation” (SW I 7:397/FS 60). As a consequence, God’s existence essentially consists in a 
dynamic interaction between the two principles, a process in which a “living unity of forces” 
(SW I 7:394/FS 59) is developed and maintained. The process in which these opposed forces 
interact gives rise to divine self-revelation and, as in the case of human beings, to a 
transparent consciousness of the opposed principles and to freedom.
67
 This is the sense in 
which God, too, is personal and spiritual.  
Still, there is a crucial difference between divine and human personhood: unlike in 
man, the self-will in God remains always subordinate to the universal will.
68
 So not only does 
divine personhood not require the possibility of choice, it even precludes it. Yet, this does not 
make God less personal or free than human beings are; rather, it is the reason why He is the 
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“highest personality” (SW I 7:395/FS 59, emphasis added) and possesses “True freedom,” a 
freedom which is “in harmony with a holy necessity” (SW I 7:391/FS 56).  
This reading of Schelling’s account of personhood adds an important further piece to 
our interpretation of his modal metaphysics. That there are these two forms of freedom—
God’s freedom that excludes indeterminist choice, and human freedom that essentially 
involves it—is not a brute fact for Schelling. Rather, human freedom is itself a necessary part 
of the one world that God cannot but create. For, precisely because the subordination of the 
self-will to the universal will can be reversed in human freedom, this form of freedom 




Were now the identity of both principles in the spirit of man exactly as indissoluble as in 
God, then there would be no distinction, that is, God as spirit would not be revealed. The 
same unity that is inseverable in God must therefore be severable in man—and this is the 
possibility of good and evil. (SW I 7:375/FS 32–33) 
</ext> 
 
Since it is absolute necessary that God reveal Himself, it is also absolutely 
necessary—in virtue of God’s loving essence—that there be human beings with indeterminist 
free will. So, while Spinoza holds that everything is necessary because it follows necessarily 
from God’s essence, Schelling counters that on an adequate understanding of God’s essence, 
it necessarily follows from this very essence that not everything is necessary. This view 
anticipates the doctrine of the “necessity of contingency” that is often ascribed to Hegel (in 
his writings from 1812 onwards).
69
 It can itself be seen as an elaboration of Fichte’s ideas in 
writings like the 1794 Foundations of the Doctrine of Science and the 1798 System of Ethics, 
where he treats an indeterminist form of freedom of the will as a necessary part of the 
realization of the absolute I.
70
 Indeed, we will see in the next section that Schelling himself 
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presents his counter-proposal to Spinoza’s necessitarianism in the Freedom Essay as being 
indebted to Fichte’s idealism.  
 
 
4. Blind Necessity as Lack of Personhood 
 
Given what we said in the last section about Schelling’s account of human and divine 
personhood, we must now ask what exact consequences this account has for the issue of blind 
necessity. I will proceed in two steps. I first develop an interpretation that sees the deficit of 
blind necessity in a lack of personal structure in God and the world. While this interpretation 
has good textual support, I argue that the dimension of Schelling’s critique that it points to is 
not compelling, as it rests on an uncharitable reading of Spinoza. I therefore go on to develop 
in section 5 an interpretation that identifies a related but distinct problem with Spinoza’s 
necessity, namely, the impossibility of a personal, action-guiding relation of love between 
God and human beings in the framework of Spinoza’s necessitarianism. That Spinozism 
leaves no space for divine personhood and a personal relation with God are not new worries, 
of course. But as we saw in the previous section, Schelling develops a highly unusual account 
of personhood. In this section, we will see that he proposes equally original versions of the 
above-mentioned worries about Spinozism on this basis.  
The first option for understanding Schelling’s notion of blind necessity—viz. in the 
sense of a lack of personal structure as such—follows quite straightforwardly from the views 
on personhood that we have summarized in the previous section. From Schelling’s 
perspective, Spinoza’s God is impersonal, not because He is not a rational agent who 
deliberates and chooses, but rather because He is not constituted by a dynamic interaction 
between the two contrasting principles of self-will and universal will. The same holds for the 
individuals that make up the finite world. It seems to be this worry that Schelling expresses 
when he states, “The error of his [Spinoza’s] system lies by no means in his placing things in 
God but in the fact that they are things—in the abstract concept of beings in the world, indeed 
of infinite substance itself, which for him is exactly also a thing” (SW I 7:349/FS 20).  
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So, on this reading, the “blindness” that Schelling ascribes to Spinoza’s necessity is a 
metaphor for the lack of personhood, life, and consciousness that Schelling locates in 
Spinoza’s substance: these features all would require for Schelling the personhood-
constituting interaction of opposed principles, which he finds lacking in Spinoza’s system. 
But why is such blindness so problematic for Schelling? One reason is, of course, that if 
Schelling is right, Spinoza is unable to do justice to a decisive dimension of our and of God’s 
nature. But there is a further important point here that makes Schelling’s critique analogous 
in a way to Leibniz’s (for whom Spinoza’s necessity was problematic because it excludes a 
form of intelligibility from God and nature, namely, that of teleology): Schelling uses the 
dynamic interaction of self-will and universal will as a form of explanation that he tries to 
extend to everything real. For Schelling, there is a sense in which personhood is 
everywhere,
71
 and makes things intelligible for us. We have seen that, for Schelling, both 
God and human beings are personal in his sense. Since, in addition, Schelling thinks that 
human beings and all other finite entities inhere in God,
72
 and participate in the very process 
that constitutes God’s personhood, he can use the two opposite dimensions in God and their 
interaction as principles of a genetic explanation for different levels of nature.
73
 Finally, we 
have seen that Schelling’s account of personhood rests on a general distinction between 
ground and existing entity that seems to apply to every individual. Since, for Schelling, the 
existence of non-human finite individuals, too, basically consists in an interaction between 
these two aspects of the individual, there is an analogous sense of personhood that applies 
even to merely natural beings. 
It seems to be this latter point that Schelling has in mind when he suggests “that 
everything real (nature, the world of things) has activity, life and freedom as its ground or, in 
Fichte’s expression, that not only is I-hood all, but also the reverse, that all is I-hood” (SW I 
7:351/FS 22). The reference to Fichte at this point is important, as it allows us to see how 
Schelling’s critique of Spinozism is connected to one of his most basic philosophical 
commitments—a commitment that he shares (at this level of abstraction) with Hegel, and that 
is inspired by Fichte’s idealism. For, as becomes clear now, Schelling not only adapts the 
basic structure of his modal metaphysics from Fichte (indeterminist freedom as being itself 
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absolutely necessary), he also draws on Fichte with regard to the form of intelligibility that 
should be attributed to reality, including non-human nature. As Schelling points out in this 
context, he has turned Fichte’s “thought of making freedom the one and all of philosophy” 
into the guiding principle of his own “higher realism”: like Fichte’s idealism, this realism is 
motivated by the “longing to make everything analogous to [freedom], to spread it 
throughout the whole universe” (SW I 7:351/FS 22). Schelling thus presents his position in 
the Freedom Essay as implementing a program that Schelling (like Hegel) was deeply 
attracted to since his days in the Stift, and that Fichte was the first to explicitly formulate and 
pursue: the program of making freedom the cornerstone of a philosophical system.
74
 Now, 
the way Schelling fleshes out this program in the Freedom Essay is precisely by using the 
personhood- and freedom-constituting dynamic described in the last section as universal 
explanatory principle, and by explaining reality as a whole in terms of the very same 
structures that we are familiar with from our own lives and their psychological and ethical 
conflicts.
75
 By contrast, Spinoza’s blind necessity, with its alleged lack of personhood and 
life, leaves no room for the form of understanding that Schelling is after, and hence is not 
compatible with the idea of a “system of freedom” that guides Schelling’s philosophical 
endeavors both in and beyond the Freedom Essay.  
I think that this reading fits well with the passages in which Schelling talks about 
blind necessity and identifies an original strand in his critique of Spinoza’s necessitarianism. 
However, the resulting critique falls short of being fully satisfactory, as it is possible to argue 
that Spinoza has the resources for accommodating many of the points that Schelling makes in 
this connection. First, Spinoza defends a parallelism for the attributes of thought and 
extension
76
 that has the consequence that every finite individual consists not only of a body, 
but also of an idea that represents this body; and many interpreters of Spinoza have argued 
that it follows from this that all finite individuals have a mind (in some way or other).
77
 From 
the viewpoint of such an interpretation, it would be mistaken to criticize Spinoza as treating 
everything as devoid of life and mind.  
Second, Spinoza also ascribes, as we saw earlier, an intellect and will, and hence, a 
mind to God—viz. an infinite mode of thought of which all finite modes of thought, and 
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hence all mental states of individual minds, are parts. Moreover, Spinoza holds that God has 
an idea of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from it.
78
 It follows that for 
every idea in God’s mind, there is a further idea that represents it; and since Spinoza seems to 
think that such an “idea of an idea” is sufficient for consciousness,
79
 it is at least a genuine 
possibility that God’s mind is conscious for Spinoza, and that this conscious mind represents 
both God himself and the entire natura naturata.  
Third, it is not even correct that Spinoza leaves no room for the dynamic form of 
intelligibility that Schelling links to his account of personhood. For in his doctrine of the 
conatus, Spinoza uses precisely a dynamic explanatory principle that applies to everything 
finite. Conatus is defined as the striving of each thing to persist in its existence.
80
 The notion 
of the conatus is central to Spinoza’s explanations for the behavior of finite modes;
81
 and 
while his notion of the conatus is clearly modeled on biological and/or psychological 
phenomena, he extends it throughout finite reality. Whereas each individual has by definition 
exactly one conatus, such that there cannot be a proper conflict or interaction of different 
conatus within one individual, the conatus of different things can conflict with each other, as 
the manifestation of one thing’s striving to persist in existence may consist in a causal 
activity that leads to a decrease in causal power, or even to the destruction, of another thing.
82
  
Thus, Schelling’s charge of blind necessity against Spinoza, if it is understood in the 
sense of a lack of personhood, turns out to presuppose an unfair reading of Spinoza. I 
therefore turn in the next section to another dimension of Schelling’s critique of Spinoza’s 
necessitarianism, which rests on a more adequate reading of Spinoza.  
 
 
5. Blind Necessity as Lack of Love 
 
As we saw in section 3, Schelling calls the dimension of the “existing entity” as applied to 
God the “will of love.” God’s will of love is a principle within God that aims at divine self-
revelation, and ultimately at the establishment of an all-embracing unity between the dual 
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principles in their fully developed, conscious forms
83
—a unity that Schelling identifies with 
the fullest form of divine love.
84
  
Now, at one point in his discussion of the character of divine creation as an action that 
is free and conscious (rather than being an instance of blind necessity), Schelling writes, “A 
plainly free or conscious will is, however, the will of love, precisely because it is this [i.e. 
will of love]: the revelation that results from it is action and deed” (SW I 7:395/FS 59, 
translation modified and emphasis added). We can understand Schelling here as follows: 
what sets apart his metaphysics from Spinoza’s with regard to blind necessity is the will of 
love that Schelling ascribes to God—more precisely, the will of love “because it is this,” 
because it is the will of love, not the will of the ground. This suggests that what is decisive for 
Schelling’s opposition to Spinoza is not so much the personal character of God in general, 
but the role love plays for divine personhood. This idea gains further support from 
Schelling’s claim that  
 
<ext> 
since this system [i.e. Spinozism] grasps altogether only one side of the Absolute—namely 
the real one or the extent to which God functions only in the ground—these propositions [i.e. 
about a necessity in God] indeed lead to a blind necessity without understanding. (SW I 
7:397/FS 61, translation modified) 
</ext> 
 
As the dimension of God that is opposed to that of the ground is the will of love, this is, 
again, tantamount to saying that what is responsible for the blindness of Spinoza’s necessity 
is Spinoza’s failure to account for the will of love.  
In which way could the role that divine love plays for the structure of God’s 
personhood add to our understanding of Schelling’s views on blind necessity? First, we need 
to clarify how precisely Schelling understands love in this context. Quoting his own earlier 
account of love in Aphorisms as an Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature of 1805, 
Schelling declares that “this is the secret of love, that it conjoins such beings of which each 
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could exist for itself, yet does not and cannot exist without the other” (SW I 7:408/FS 70, 
translation modified). Hence, love in Schelling’s sense is a symmetrical and non-reflexive 
relation (symmetrical because Schelling’s formulation implies that love is always reciprocal, 
and non-reflexive because the formulation implies that love obtains between interdependent 
but distinct relata). This relation obtains between individuals who renounce the independent 




How does love, thus understood, affect God’s agency? Schelling points out that God’s 
creation of the world is “induced by the love that it [i.e. the divine spirit] itself is” (SW I 
7:361/FS 30, translation modified). In other words, God creates the world out of love. Since 
love, in Schelling’s sense, is a relation between distinct relata, this raises the question: out of 
love towards whom does God create the world? Given Schelling’s definition of love, the 
target of God’s action out of love can only be the relatively independent, personal entities 
with whom He decides to share His existence by creating them; that is, us, the finite persons 
within the world. Divine creation, understood in this sense, is quite an unusual form of an 
action out of love: it is undertaken for a loved one who only comes into being through this 
very action.  
There is a further important aspect to the agency that God undertakes out of love 
towards human beings. As we saw earlier, Schelling holds that God’s creation leaves the 
moral character of human beings “undecided” (SW I 7:385/FS 51). It was possible for human 
beings to choose a good character, and presumably, had they done so, the world would have 
directly reached the state of all-embracing love that is the ultimate goal of the will of love. 
But since human beings have chosen evil moral characters—and therefore decided to step out 
of their relation of love with God—further divine action is needed to re-establish that love, 
namely, a redemptory action that includes the incarnation of Christ, and that Schelling calls a 




in order to counter personal and spiritual evil, the light of the spirit in fact appears likewise in 
the shape of a human person [i.e. of Christ] and as a mediator in order to reestablish the 
rapport between God and creation at the highest level. For only what is personal can heal 
what is personal, and God must become man so that man may return to God. (SW I 7:380/FS 
46, emphasis added) 
</ext> 
 
Since Schelling rejects the idea that God chooses between different possibilities, we 
should assume that God’s agency in the history of salvation is just as necessary as His initial 
creation, and that it is made thus necessary by God’s essential goodness and love.
86
 So like 
the initial creation, God’s redemptory action is a result of His love—and more precisely, as 
we have seen, of His love towards human beings.  
So, for Schelling, God’s agency, both in His initial creation and in His redemptory 
action, is undertaken out of love towards us. At the same time, we saw that it is the relation of 
those actions to God’s will of love that sets them apart from blind necessity and makes them 
expressions of a “free or conscious will” (SW I 7:395/FS 59). We can understand the 
connection between these points as follows.  
First, God’s will of love is manifested in actions out of love, that is, in actions that are 
motivated by His love towards human beings. But it seems essential to an action out of love 
that it be oriented towards the loved one, that the loved one figures (in some positive way) in 
a description of the reason for the action. So, although Schelling rejects Leibniz’s account of 
God as ideal rational agent, it seems that when he himself describes God as acting out of 
love, he must ascribe at least some purposive structure to that agency, and assume that His 
will of love guides His action. It is natural to describe actions that are thus orientated towards 
another person as actions that the agent undertakes with a regard or with a view to the loved 
one, or that in thus acting, he has the beloved in view. These metaphors allow us to see how a 
divine action that is oriented towards the human beings whom God loves can be contrasted 
with a blind action, which lacks such an orientation. On the resulting reading, Schelling 
describes the action of Spinoza’s God as blind because it cannot be an action that is 
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undertaken out of love and oriented towards the beloved one. This follows from Spinoza’s 
denial that the divine will could guide His action, and from his rejection of the view that God 
acts for purposes (see sect. 1).  
One could object to this proposal that Schelling does not explicitly use metaphors like 
that of God having human beings “in view” when he describes divine action in the Freedom 
Essay. Yet to this, one can reply that related metaphors do form an important part of the 
background of Schelling’s discussion. For the notion of a divine action out of love towards 
human beings is directly related to the traditional concept of divine providence, and the very 
term ‘providence’ is derived from the visual sphere: it describes a form of (divine) agency 
that displays “foresight,” but also “looks after” those whom God loves.
87
 While Schelling 
does not employ the concept of providence in the Freedom Essay itself, he does use it in 
earlier texts that are relevant to his engagement with Spinoza—in particular in the System of 
Transcendental Idealism of 1800, where he opposes an understanding of history as guided by 
“providence” (SW I 3:604/System of Transcendental Idealism, 212) to fatalist views, for 
which everything is governed by the “wholly blind force” of a fate that acts “coldly and 
unwittingly” (SW I 3:603/System of Transcendental Idealism, 211). (Spinoza, by contrast, 
does not reject the notion of divine providence, but he gives deflationary accounts of it: in the 
Short Treatise, he identifies divine providence with the conatus of finite things [G I.40/KV 
84], while in the Theological-Political Treatise, he identifies it with the order of nature [G 
III.82/TTP 153], pointing out that “God takes account, not of the human race only, but of the 
whole of nature” [G III.88/TTP 160]. The providence of Schelling’s God who acts 
specifically with a concern for human beings is clearly ruled out by such accounts.) 
Second, there is a further important aspect to the idea of God as acting with human 
beings “in view.” The optical metaphor may be read as conveying not only the purposiveness 
of the action, but also the agent’s ability to take in information about the properties and needs 
of the one who is meant to profit from the action, and to adapt the action accordingly. This is 
exactly the case with God’s redemptory action, as Schelling understands it. This action 
presupposes a genuine openness of God to the decisions that human beings make in their 
choice of moral character: as we saw, God reacts, if necessary, with His redemptory action in 
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the “second creation” to human choice. This second aspect of Schelling’s alternative to 
“blind” divine agency stands even in stronger opposition to Spinoza’s position than the first 
aspect: it requires not only a divine “will of love” that guides God’s action, it also requires (a) 
indeterminism (because of the unconditioned freedom of human choice of character), and (b) 
a passive element in God (as He reacts to our choices). While indeterminism is ruled out, of 
course, by Spinoza’s necessitarianism, Spinoza explicitly holds that every form of passivity 
constitutes a lack of perfection,
88




So, on the resulting reading of this dimension in Schelling’s understanding of blind 
necessity, what Schelling finds so deeply unsatisfactory about Spinoza’s necessitarianism 
turns out to be its failure to admit of the form of action-guiding divine love towards human 
beings that Schelling describes in the Freedom Essay.  
To this critique, one might object that the topic of love between God and man is not 
something that Spinoza ignores. He not only sees an “intellectual love” of man towards God 
as constituting the highest form of contentment and pleasure,
90
 he also holds that there is a 
sense in which God intellectually loves man.
91
 So, does Schelling’s critique not again rest on 
an incomplete or uncharitable understanding of Spinoza?  
I think that this worry can be assuaged if it is realized how much God’s intellectual 
love, as Spinoza understands it, differs from the love that Schelling ascribes to God.
92
 For 
Spinoza, God’s intellectual love towards man is a special case of an infinite love that God 
feels towards Himself—a joy that He has in being aware of His perfection (through the idea 
that He has of Himself
93
), and that is accompanied by the idea of Himself as cause of this 
joy.
94
 One “part” of this love is a love of God towards Himself insofar as he contains the 
essence of human mind,
95
 and this part of God’s self-love can also be described as 
intellectual love of God towards men.
96
 
This account of divine love has three important consequences. First, God’s 
intellectual love towards man cannot motivate any divine actions. Since God is both 
absolutely perfect and immutable, and His necessary action of immanent causation exhausts 
the sphere of possibility, He cannot through his awareness of Himself detect any need or 
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occasion for a further action that is not already necessitated by His nature. So, Spinoza’s God 
cannot do anything out of His love towards men. 
Second, just as God’s infinite self-love includes as a part an intellectual love of God 
towards men, it also includes intellectual love towards all other modes.
97
 By contrast, the 
divine love that Schelling describes and that motivates God’s creation and redemption is a 
love specifically towards men (as creatures who, in virtue of their free will, can exist in 




Third, God’s love towards men, as Spinoza understands it, is an aspect of His self-
love. What matters for God in this loving relation is not the individual human being 
considered in itself, but only man insofar as he is a mode of God. By contrast, Schelling 
understands divine love as a relation to something distinct from God: the target of God’s love 




So, it turns out that Spinoza and Schelling have two very different accounts of divine 
love, and Schelling is right when he implies that Spinoza leaves no room for the form of 
divine love that he himself wants to defend.  
 
 
6. Restrictions on God’s Agency and the Openness of Schelling’s Theism 
 
By way of conclusion, I wish to address a more general worry that one may have regarding 
Schelling’s position in the Freedom Essay, as I have interpreted it. In the preceding 
discussion, it turned out to be a crucial aspect of Schelling’s metaphysics, in that text, that he 
restricts, compared to both Spinoza and Leibniz, the extent of divine agency. Does this 
restriction not undermine the very notion of God as perfect and omnipotent being, thus 
leading to an utterly unstable position?  
To address this question, it will be useful to distinguish three aspects in which 
Schelling may be said to limit God’s agency. (1) Divine agency does not involve free choice, 
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on his view, but is bound by necessity (cf. Schelling’s “One World” thesis). (2) God’s agency 
does not settle all truths about the world He creates; partly, it is up to the free choice of 
human beings to decide about these truths. (3) God is not entirely active in His self-
revelation. Rather, once He has created the finite world, He partly reacts to human choice 
(since it depends on this choice whether the finite world directly takes an ideal form, or 
whether instead divine redemption is needed for this).  
Of these points, (2) is shared by many theistic thinkers. The assumption of libertarian 
human freedom is widespread in theistic traditions, and this assumption cannot be maintained 
without restricting God’s agency in the sense of (2).
100
 However, this restriction need not be 
understood as being in conflict with God’s omnipotence and perfection. On traditional 
accounts, as on Schelling’s, it is not because of a weakness or imperfection that God does not 
fully settle each detail of the world in creation; rather, this is a necessary consequence of the 
perfection that consists in God’s ability to produce creatures endowed with free will.  
(1), by contrast, is in conflict with many traditional theistic accounts of God’s agency. 
Yet again, it is not clear that this point contradicts God’s perfection and omnipotence. Both 




 hold that (1) follows from 
an adequate understanding of divine perfection because such perfection requires that God 
acts only out of the necessity of His own nature (on Spinoza’s view), or because it rules out 
that God could create any but the best possible world (on Anselm’s and Abelard’s view).  
Finally, Schelling’s adoption of point (3) in the Freedom Essay is a move through 
which he approaches Christian orthodoxy with its idea of divine redemption (whereas in 
earlier writings, he had followed Spinoza in ascribing to God or the Absolute a pure activity 
or “absolute causality” [SW I 1:316/“Philosophical Letters,” 178] that is devoid of any 
receptive dimension). However, despite its central role in biblical texts and Christian 
theology, the idea of a history of salvation as personal interaction between God and man does 
not fit easily with dominant views of God’s perfection (at least if it is combined with the 
assumption of libertarian human freedom). For divine perfection is traditionally seen as 
requiring immutability, and this stands in tension with the idea of a genuine divine openness 
towards the outcome of human decisions. 
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 How problematic this tension really is depends to a large extent on what view of 
divine foreknowledge is adopted. If God has (as on many traditional accounts) full 
foreknowledge of human choices even though we make them with libertarian freedom, it may 
be possible that He forms in one and the same act both His intention to create this world, and 
His intention to redeem the world in a determinate way.  
Schelling addresses divine foreknowledge when he writes that  
 
<ext> 
the question still remains whether the act of self-revelation was free in the sense that all 
consequences of it were foreseen in God? But this too is necessarily to be affirmed; for the 
will to revelation would not itself be living if no other will turning back into the inner realm 
of being did not oppose it: but in this holding-in-itself emerges a reflexive picture of all that 
is implicitly contained in the essence in which God ideally realizes himself or, what is the 
same thing, recognizes himself beforehand in his becoming real. (SW I 7:397/FS 60) 
</ext>  
 
I read Schelling here as restricting God’s foreknowledge to those features of the created 
world that God settles in His initial creation. For Schelling here explains this foreknowledge 
as knowledge that God has of His own essence. It therefore does not seem to include 
knowledge about the free human decisions, which, as we have seen, go beyond that which 
follows necessarily from God’s essence. Consequently, divine foreknowledge cannot include 
proper knowledge about God’s own redemptory action either (although it may include 
conditional knowledge about what God will do if humans decide in a particular way).  
So instead of using divine foreknowledge to reduce the tensions between the idea of a 
history of salvation and traditional views of divine perfection, Schelling restricts 
foreknowledge, and emphasizes instead the character of the history of salvation as personal 
interaction between God and man: from the viewpoint of God in the initial creation, it is an 
open question what moral character men will adopt, and hence whether there will be a need 
for a redemptory action or not.
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 In the Freedom Essay, Schelling is ambivalent about how 
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exactly this openness relates to the issue of divine immutability. His account of the choice of 
character as atemporal and eternal deed (see sect. 2) suggests that some atemporal sequential 
ordering relation obtains between the first creation, man’s choice of character, and God’s 
redemptory action (whatever the nature of such a relation may be). In other passages, 
Schelling bites the bullet and accepts that there is a sense in which God is subject to change: 
“God is a life, not merely a Being. All life has a destiny, however, and is subject to suffering 
and becoming” (SW I 7:404/FS 66). This is a radical move, of course, but for Schelling it is, 
once more, a consequence of God’s perfection, rather than a limit upon it: Schelling does not 
locate divine perfection anymore in absolute activity in the Freedom Essay—as he did, under 




So in order to make his views about point (3) consistent with the idea that God is 
perfect, Schelling tentatively sketches a revised view of divine perfection.
105
 That Schelling is 
exploring here a genuine and innovative theoretical option is suggested by the fact that the 
resulting position anticipates “open” or “relational” versions of theism in contemporary 
theology and philosophy of religion; views that, like Schelling’s, restrict divine 
foreknowledge, revise traditional views of divine perfection, and emphasize the idea of a 
history of salvation as a common personal history between God and man, in which God is 







In his discussion of Spinoza’s necessitarianism in the Freedom Essay, Schelling does not 
offer what Hegel would call an ‘immanent’ critique of Spinoza. Schelling does not identify 
inconsistencies in Spinoza’s view, or gaps in his arguments. His objections to Spinoza’s 
necessitarianism are based on premises or theoretical desiderata that Spinoza need not accept. 
Nevertheless, Schelling does succeed in providing an original perspective on Spinozism by 
disentangling the issues of divine choice, divine personhood, and necessitarianism, and by 
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developing an original counter-proposal to blind necessity: a robust and innovative account 
of divine personhood, love, and perfection that is still compatible with the view that there is 
only one way in which God can act, and which can thereby avoid the problems that confront 
Leibniz’s theory (or, for that matter, any other theory that assumes divine choice and treats 
God as an ideal rational agent). Schelling’s discussion of Spinoza in the Freedom Essay thus 
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Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz, 10–11; and Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza, 94.  
25
 On the precise sense of Leibniz’s ‘hypothetical necessity,’ see Adams, Leibniz, 16–20; cf. 
also Martin Lin, “Rationalism and Necessitarianism.” 
26
 The Theodicy is cited by ‘T’ and paragraph numbers as in G 6:21–437 (where G is cited by 
volume and page numbers), followed by page references to Huggard’s English translation. In 
connection with necessitarianism, Leibniz uses “logical” (T §349/Theodicy, 334), 
“metaphysical” (T §174/Theodicy, 236; T §349/Theodicy, 334) and “geometrical” (T 
§347/Theodicy, 333) necessity as synonyms for absolute necessity; we will encounter these 
terms in Schelling, too. In other places, Leibniz adds that, in order to be absolutely necessary, 
something also needs to be necessary per se, or through its own nature. Cf. Adams, Leibniz, 
17. Yet his discussion of various forms of necessitarianism does not seem to employ this 
stronger notion of absolute necessity, since none of the authors Leibniz discusses here holds 
that everything is necessary through its own nature.  
27
 T §173/Theodicy, 235. 
28
 T §345–46/Theodicy, 332–33. 
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29
 For one influential formulation of this view, cf. Aquinas, Summa theologica, Ia q14 a5 (on 
God’s intellect), Ia q19 a2, a4 (on God’s will and its cooperation with God’s intellect in 
creation), and Ia q19 a10 and Ia q25 a6 (on God’s free will, and His ability to create other 
[and even better] worlds). References to Summa theologica are by part number, quaestio 
number, and article number.)  
30
 As opposed to an action for which there is an (explanatory) reason—Spinoza, of course, 
does not deny the latter. 
31
 E IP33S2. 
32
 E.g. E IIP11C. 
33
 E.g. G.III 62/TTP 62. 
34
 E IP31; cf. E IP32C2. More precisely, both the divine intellect and the divine will—which 
coincide for Spinoza (E IIP49C; G III.62/TTP 131)—are, on a plausible reading, an infinite 
mode in the attribute of thought, of which all finite modes of thought are parts (cf. E IIP11C; 
Letter 64, G IV.278/C II.439). Cf. Michael Della Rocca, Spinoza, 73–74; and Yitzhak 
Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 133.  
35
 T Appendix II (“Reflexions sur l’ouvrage que M. Hobbes a publié”); and §3/Theodicy, 395. 
36
 Leibniz and Clarke, Correspondence, 16. 
37
 This point may even be considered a further connotation of the notion of ‘blind necessity.’ 
In a related context, Kant remarks that the ‘blind’ in ‘blind necessity’ can be read in two 
ways: “Blind means when one oneself cannot see; but also that through which one cannot 
see. Blind necessity is thus that by means of which we can see nothing with the 
understanding” (“Metaphysik L1,” 28:199). Cf. Kant’s example of “opaque glass” in 
“Metaphysik Mrongovius,” 29:923. The Latin caecus has similar derivative uses: the 
Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, s.v., mentions ‘obscure,’ ‘hidden,’ and ‘unknown’). Kant’s 
works are cited by volume and page numbers from Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften. 
38
 E IP11Dem2. 
39
 Cf. New Essays on Human Understanding, A VI 6:73.  
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40
 SW I 7:398/FS 61. 
41
 Quoted at length at SW I 7:396/FS 60. 
42
 Translation amended.  
43
 SW I 7:397/FS 61. 
44
 Cf. Adams, Leibniz, 16.  
45
 This passage speaks against the reading of Buchheim, “Anmerkungen des Herausgebers,” 
156, on which Schelling’s claim that God cannot but create one world relates only to an 
“ideal” world, namely, the state of perfection that God had originally planned for His 
creation. Elsewhere, Buchheim argues that God was free not to create any finite world for 
Schelling (cf. also Moiso, “Gott als Person,” 210–11), since His nature of self-diffusing love 
is already fulfilled by the inner-trinitarian relation between Father and Son (Buchheim, 
“Freispruch durch Geschichte,” 369–70). But this is contradicted by the conjunction of 
Schelling’s claims that “God is essentially love and goodness” (SW I 7:397/FS 61), and that 
“the action of revelation in God [i.e. as is clear from the context, the creation of the finite 
world] is necessary . . . in regard to goodness and love” (SW I 7:397/FS 60). It is true, 
however, that Schelling will come to embrace the view on which God is free to create a 
world or not in later writings, beginning soon after the Freedom Essay in the first draft of the 
Ages of the World (cf. Schelling, Weltalter, 98–99).  
46
 Cf. Adams, Leibniz, 9–52. 
47
 Schelling does not deny that God is free (remember, he sees revelation as a “free and 
conscious action”); but he understands this freedom (like Spinoza, e.g. E ID7) merely as 
action out of the necessity of the agent’s own nature (SW I 7:384/FS 50; SW I 7:391–92/FS 
56). When Schelling describes creation as a “decision [Entscheidung]” at SW I 7:397/FS 60, 
he probably has in mind an etymological interpretation of the term as Ent-scheidung, a 




                                                                                                                                                                               
48
 Cf. also SW I 7:384–85/FS 49–50. Commentators agree (at least implicitly) that 
Schelling’s view of human freedom in the Freedom Essay requires choice or alternative 
possibilities<Singular/plural disagreement. Suggest ‘requires choice or alternative 
possibilities’ or ‘a choice between alternative possibilities CR>. See, e.g. Wilhelm Jacobs, 
“Entscheidung,” 129–30; Friedrich Hermanni, Die letzte Entlastung, 127, 146–47; Siegbert 
Peetz, Die Freiheit im Wissen, 196, 215, 217; Michelle Kosch, Freedom and Reason, 95–96, 
“Idealism and Freedom in Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift,” 150; and Thomas Buchheim, “Der 
Begriff,” 210. 
49
 That is, the negation of global determinism. This is compatible with local determinism for 
some part of reality, such as the psychological determinism that Schelling may subscribe to 
(SW I 7:383/FS 49). Cf. Hermanni, Die letzte Entlastung, 144. Moiso, “Gott als Person,” sees 
Schelling’s denial of divine choice as consequence from a view like a Kant’s, in the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment (5:401–2), that the modal categories of possibility, actuality and 
necessity are distinguishable only from the viewpoint of a finite understanding (cf. also 
Martin Heidegger, Schelling: Vom Wesen, 276). But since Schelling, in the Freedom Essay, 
(unlike Kant) sees modal categories as dealing with objective modal properties of things or 
states of affairs, this reading would entail that necessity, actuality, and possibility are not 
really distinct, which is tantamount to necessitarianism. (Kant’s Gesammelte Werke are cited 
by volume and page number.) 
50
 Cf., e.g. T §360/Theodicy, 341: “God sees all at once the whole sequence of this universe, 
when he chooses it.” 
51
 This is, e.g. Anselm’s view. See Katherin Rogers, Anselm on Freedom. Cf. Buchheim, 
“Freispruch durch Geschichte,” 374–77. 
52
 This may seem to clash with common views about divine perfection. I address this worry 
in sect. 6, below.  
53
 Cf. SW I 7:384/FS 50; SW I 7:391–92/FS 56. 
54
 SW I 7:363/FS 32; SW I 7:413/FS 75. 
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55
 Cf. in particular the contributions in Thomas Buchheim and Friedrich Hermanni, eds. Alle 
Persönlichkeit.  
56
 This usage of the term is inspired by the literal meaning of the Latin existere: to step out, 
emerge, appear. Cf. Hermanni, Die letzte Entlastung, 88.  
57
 Cf. SW I 7:438/“Stuttgart Seminars,” 210. 
58
 Cf. Friedrich Hermanni, Die letzte Entlastung, and “Der Grund der Persönlichkeit Gottes.” 
In one passage from the “Stuttgart Seminars,” Schelling alludes to traditional accounts of 
individuation when he identifies the ground in God with a “matter” (SW I 7:435/“Stuttgart 
Seminars,” 208). 
59
 Cf. SW I 7:387/FS 52: “through this act [i.e. the free choice of moral character] even the 
type and constitution of his [man’s] corporeal formation is determined.” 
60
 Cf. Hermanni, Die letzte Entlastung, 91–93.  
61
 E.g. SW I 7:361/FS 30.  
62
 Cf. Hermanni, Die letzte Entlastung, and “Der Grund der Persönlichkeit Gottes.” 
63
 SW I 7:362–63/FS 31–32. 
64
 Cf. SW I 7:390/FS 54. 
65
 Taken on its own, this passage could suggest that personhood is distinct from spirit and 
defined as a connection between spirit and particular being. But Schelling later refers back to 
this passage by writing that “personality is founded . . . on the connection between a self-
determining [selbständig] being and a basis independent of him” (SW I 7:394/FS 59), where 
‘self-determining being’ refers to the dimension of the existing entity (cf. SW I 7:359/FS 28).  
66
 SW I 7:394/FS 59. 
67
 Cf. SW I 7:405/FS 68, where Schelling identifies “divine consciousness” with divine 
“spirit.”  
68
 SW I 7:373/FS 41. 
69
 Cf. Dieter Henrich’s seminal article, “Hegels Theorie über den Zufall.”  
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70
 Cf., e.g. GA I 2:411/Foundations, 246; and GA I 4:50–52/System of Ethics, 52–54. 
References to GA are by series, volume and page number. (The Academy edition of Fichte’s 
works is divided into four series: series I contains Fichte’s published works, series II his 
posthumous writings, series III his correspondence, and series IV transcripts of his lectures.) 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this way of connecting Schelling’s position to 
Fichte.  
71
 Cf. on this point Heidegger, Schelling: Vom Wesen, 162, 171. 
72
 Cf. the beginning of passage that I have just quoted: “The error of his [Spinoza’s] system 
lies by no means in his placing things in God” (SW I 7:349/FS 20). 
73
 SW I 7:361/FS 30. 
74
 Cf. e.g. Fichte’s famous claim, “My system is the first system of freedom” (draft of a letter 
to Baggesen, GA III 2:298/“Correspondence,” 385); in the same year (1795), Schelling writes 
to Hegel that freedom is the “alpha and omega of all philosophy” (Hegel, Briefe, 1:22/Letters, 
32). References to GA are by series, volume, and page number. For the connection between 
this and the Freedom Essay, cf. Peetz, Die Freiheit im Wissen. Of course, Schelling also 
thinks that implementing the idea of a “system of freedom” requires him to go beyond Fichte 
by assuming a genuine non-subjective, non-mental dimension both in the Absolute and in 
finite reality; hence, his reference in this context to his own “higher realism,” and to Fichte’s 
“subjective idealism” as “misunderstanding itself” (SW I 7:351/FS 22, translation modified).  
75
 Indeed, this is the form of comprehension that Schelling himself draws on for his 
metaphysical explanations in writings such as the Freedom Essay. Cf. Schelling’s related 
defense of “anthropomorphism” in his reply to Eschenmayer, SW I 8:167.  
76
 E IIP7. 
77
 E.g. Jonathan Bennett, A Study on Spinoza’s Ethics, 135–39, Della Rocca, Spinoza, 108–
11, and Martin Lin, “Spinoza’s Panpsychism,” who all explicitly ascribe panpsychism to 
Spinoza. Cf. Don Garrett, “Representation and Consciousness,” 6–7, and Steven Nadler, 
“Spinoza and Consciousness,” 590. Spinoza writes in E IIP13S, “whatever we have said of 
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the idea of the human Body”—hence, also that it constitutes a mind, as he had claimed 
immediately before (“The object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the Body” [E 
IIP13]) “must also be said of the idea of any thing”; and, “the things we have shown so far 
are completely general and do not pertain more to man than to other Individuals, all of which, 
though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate.” But see Harry Austryn Wolfson, The 
Philosophy of Spinoza, 2:58–59 for a non-panpsychist interpretation of Spinoza.  
78
 E IIP3. 
79
 E IIIP9Dem. 
80
 E IIIP7. 
81
 As in his theory of affects, e.g. E IIIP9S. 
82
 E.g. E IIIP11; IVP3; IVP5. 
83
 SW I 7:405–6/FS 68. 
84
 SW I 7:406/FS 68. 
85
 Cf. also Buchheim, “Freispruch durch Geschichte,” 359–60; and Jürgen Habermas, 
“Dialektischer Idealismus,” 192–93. 
86
 Strictly speaking, God’s redemptory action is necessary, for Schelling, really only on the 
condition that we choose evil; so, it is not really true that everything that God does follows 
from His loving essence with unconditional (“absolute”) necessity (SW I 7:397/FS 60). (Cf. 
Jon Marenbon, Abelard in Four Dimensions, 48, who points out a parallel problem in 
Abelard.) 
87
 The Latin providere can both mean ‘act with foresight’ and ‘look after, care for’ (Charlton 
Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, s.v.).  
88
 E VP40. 
89
 Schelling is very much aware of this aspect of Spinoza’s position. Cf. SW I 1:195–96/“Of 
the I,” 95–96. 
90
 E VP27. 
91
 E VP36C. 
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92
 An anonymous referee suggests that there is also a significant difference between 
Spinoza’s and Schelling’s views on man’s love for God, as Spinoza, unlike Schelling, 
understands this love as a cool, non-affective attitude. But while it is true that Spinoza’s amor 
intellectualis Dei is a condition in which we control our passive emotions (E VP38), it is, qua 
form of love, an emotion (cf. E VP15Dem), and, more precisely, a self-caused, and therefore 
“active,” emotion (E IIID3 with E VP36Dem). That Spinoza’s descriptions of this love as 
highest pleasure, contentment, and blessedness (E VP27; VP36S) are not just empty phrases 
is suggested by the fact that Spinoza draws here on substantive theories of happiness and 
love, viz. on the theories of Jewish Platonists like Leo Hebraeus and Aristotelians like 
Maimonides, which in their turn are rooted in Plato’s theory of eros in the Symposium, and in 
Aristotle’s theory of contemplation in Nicomachean Ethics, book 10 (cf. Wolfson, The 
Philosophy of Spinoza, 2:275–83; Han van Ruler, “Amor intellectualis Dei”; and Lee Rice, 
“Love of God in Spinoza,” 104–5nn5–7). Admittedly, Schelling’s and Spinoza’s views on 
man’s love for God differ in another respect (which was also suggested to me by the referee): 
man’s love for God can lead to actions out of love for Schelling, but not for Spinoza. For 
Spinoza, man can act out of love towards other human beings, but not out of love towards 
God (this would require an attempt to increase God’s pleasure, but God cannot have pleasure 
[E IIIP33D with E VP17], and there is in man an adequate and perfect idea of God [E IIP46–
47, cited in a related context in E VP18Dem]). By contrast, Schelling’s account clearly leaves 
open the possibility of action out of love for God; and Schelling explicitly ascribes a 
motivational role to love in general when he describes it as principle of enthusiasm (FS 415), 
relates this enthusiasm to Plato’s “divine madness” (SW I 7:470/“Stuttgart Seminars,” 233), 
and characterizes such madness as the “foundation . . . of efficacy in general” (SW I 
7:470/“Stuttgart Seminars,” 233).  
93
 Cf. the reference to E IIP3 in the proof for E VP35. 
94
 E VP35. 
95
 E VP36. 
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96
 As well as intellectual love of men towards God (E VP36C). 
97
 Cf. Yitzhak Melamed, “Spinoza’s Amor Dei Intellectualis.”  
98
 Cf. (specifically about divine love for man) G I.104/KV 142. 
99
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this third point.  
100
 Examples of theistic authors who assume libertarian human freedom include the church 
fathers before Augustine, Anselm, Duns Scotus, Molina, Arminius, Suárez, Bishop Bramhall, 
Malebranche, Clarke, Reid, and on some readings also Maimonides, Aquinas, Descartes and 
Kant. In contemporary Christian philosophy, there even tends to be a consensus on 
libertarianism (cf. Lynne Rudder Baker, “Why Christians Should not be Libertarians”).  
101
 Cf. Rogers, Anselm on Freedom.  
102
 Cf. Marenbon, Abelard in Four Dimension.  
103
 Cf. also Habermas, “Dialektischer Idealismus,” 189, who reads Schelling as holding that 
in creating man as free, God accepts a genuine risk.  
104
 SW I 7:405–6/FS 68. 
105
 Schelling will further develop this approach in his late Positive Philosophy; e.g. 
Philosophie der Mythologie, SW II 1:566–71. 
106
 Cf. e.g. Alan Rhoda et al., “Open Theism.”  
107 I am indebted to Marcela García, Erasmus Mayr, and anonymous referees for the Journal 
of the History of Philosophy for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this text. 
